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Abstract. Record linkage is a technique for integrating data from sources or 
providers where direct access to the data is not possible due to security and privacy 
considerations. This is a very common scenario for medical data, as patient privacy 
is a significant concern. To avoid privacy leakage, researchers have adopted k-
anonymity to protect raw data from re-identification however they cannot avoid 
associated information loss, e.g. due to generalisation. Given that individual-level 
data is often not disclosed in the linkage cases, but yet remains potentially re-
discoverable, we propose semantic-based linkage k-anonymity to de-identify 
record linkage with fewer generalisations and eliminate inference disclosure 
through semantic reasoning. 
Keywords. Medical record linkage, de-identification, k-anonymity, semantic 
reasoning 
Introduction 
In the biomedical field, record linkage has been recognised as a key approach used to 
support in-depth research on areas including public health and individual well-being. 
Different from two-party protocols where only two database owners participate in 
linkage process, a trusted third party is often adopted where records are sent from 
distributed sources and used for healthcare and medical research [1]. For instance, the 
Centre for Health Record Linkage (CHeReL, http://www.cherel.org.au/) uses 
probabilistic matching on demographic data to create linked health records across the 
New South Wales and Australian Capital Territory. Using the “Master Linkage Key” 
(MLK) generated from the matching process, record linkage is forged according to the 
attributes requested by users. Due to the sensitivities of health information, record 
linkage typically needs to be de-identified before being released to applicants. However 
existing methods are often vulnerable to re-identification caused by skewed 
distributions and data dependencies (e.g. equivalent, inclusive relations) among 
attributes. To tackle this issue, we propose the linkage anonymity scheme with 
semantic verification that ensures that latent privacy leakage can be detected and 
prevented from occurring. This is the focus of this paper. 
                                                          
1 Corresponding Author: PhD candidate Yang Lu, Department of Computing and Information System, The 
University of Melbourne, Parkville VIC 3010; Email: luy4@student.unimelb.edu.au. 
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1. Privacy Preservation for Record Linkage 
Security models designed for the health records are typically based on the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) involve removing or 
obfuscating identifying information, limiting unnecessary access and separating 
attributes that can be used for potential individual disclosure [2]. However by using 
background knowledge from disclosure files (DFs) it is the case that individuals in such 
data can be inferred (re-identified) by internal users2. As one example, Mr. Smith is the 
only patient over 80 years old in a given cancer registry. If his clinicians know this by 
accessing his raw records, then such minor facts about non-identifiable attributes (e.g. 
Age>80) may lead to re-identification. To tackle this background leakage issue, 
Sweeney (2002) proposed the classic k-anonymity processing quasi-identifiers (QIs) to 
satisfy privacy requirements, i.e. any individuals represented in a released data set must 
be indistinguishable from at least k-1 other individuals [3]. To achieve this, attributes 
need to be generalised (suppressed) until there exist at least k identical records before 
the dataset can be released. To reduce the impact on the quality of information [4], we 
propose linkage k-anonymity (LA) by which (obfuscated) individuals in a released 
linkage set are required to be indistinguishable from at least k-1 other individuals in the 
local dataset. The idea behind this is that most linkage cases do not include all local 
patients and thus not all modifying data for privacy-preserving purposes is used. To 
explain this, Figure 1 shows a scenario where record linkage is used through the LA 
method. Suppose clinicians working at Hospital A apply to have the linkage between 
their dataset ‘Hospital A’ and the external data set ‘Pharmacy B’ supported. Instead of 
processing the linkage on the QI union {Year of Birth (YoB), Sex, Nationality, 
Language} to meet the requirement klinkage composed of local k values3, LA will only 
transform the local dataset that may be possibly known by the requestors, e.g. 
executing 3-anonymity on the local QI attributes {YoB, Sex, Nationality} in Hospital A 
and replacing the raw tuples in the linkage set with generalised records so that users 
have 1/3 chance (at most) to re-identify patients by matching with local records. For the 
tuple <1971-1980, F, Chinese, Mandarin> in the linkage set, three individuals (Ashly, 
Alice and Jessica) are matched at Hospital A and thus meet the requirement klinkage=3. 
Therefore, LA provides the same privacy-preserving effect as the classic anonymity 
method by distinguishing QI and Non-QI attributes (i.e. QI attributes only in Pharmacy 
B) on a case-by-case basis, whilst using classic k-anonymity on the linkage set results in 
more-transformed tuples, e.g. <1960-1980, *, Asian, *> and causes more data loss. 
 
 
                                                          
2 Internal user with regards to a linkage project refers to requestors who are authenticated by related 
databases and thus have access to certain information of data owners (patients). 
3 klinkage refers to the maximum k among the member datasets, i.e. max{k1, …, kn}. 
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Figure 1. Linkage processed with linkage 3-anonymity. 
 
 
Applying syntax-based transformation alone may not be sufficient to prevent 
privacy leakage occurring since any changes in privacy policies at local sites may 
impact the linkage anonymity in terms of k values and QIs. For instance, from the 
linkage released in Figure 1, it is not difficult for users to identify the association 
Mandarin (Language) → Chinese (Ethnicity). As a result, Hospital A could request 
the same linkage while additionally using Language as the fourth QI locally. As shown 
in Figure 2, by executing the LA on the full scheme, linkage tuple <1960-1980, *, Asian, 
Mandarin> can be generated to match three individuals (Alice, Ashly and Jack). 
However, based on the association, the tuple can be refined as <1960-1980, *, Chinese, 
Mandarin>. As a result, the previous linkage release can cause privacy violations by 
increasing the chance of re-identification from 1/3 to 1/2. Although the Language itself 
does not help re-identify patients, N-gram associations can be utilised to refine values 




Figure 2. Linkage processed with linkage 3-anonymity (scheme updated). 
2. Method - Semantic-based Linkage Anonymity  
General solutions for inference disclosure involve ruling out risky associations from 
previous linked data releases. Current research in this direction focuses on association 
rule mining which deals with transaction records with “0/1” values marking the 
appearance of items and numerically calculating the confidence of the association 
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evaluation [5]. The Eq. (1) is defined to identify the association rule such as X→Y by 





 ≥ S%; Confidencex→y ≥ C% (1) 
where |Rlinkage| = the number of records in the linkage set 
|Rx (x, y)| = the number of records contain the tuple x (or both tuple x and y)  
S% = the minimum numeric support level 
C% = the minimum numeric confidence level 
 
Local schemes can be freely and frequently updated. Therefore, it is necessary to 
enable semantic-based verification to anonymous tuples. Figure 3 shows a class 
diagram modelling components of linkage k-anonymity (LA) framework. Based on the 
rules defined in Table 1, two procedures - LA scheme formation and semantic-based 
risk analysis are implemented to support linkage de-identification. Upon receiving a 
request to link databases DB1 and DB2 as linkage Ln1, semantic rules will be used for 
reasoning to track and compose the classic k-anonymity requirements in the related 
databases, e.g. hasAnoReq(DB1, 2) hasAnoReq(DB2, 3) where 2 and 3 are their 
respective k values. With regards to completeness, Rule 2 speculates that linkage will 
be processed with the highest requirement of all datasets involved. As a result, the 
klinkage will be calculated and then enforced to the linkage case Ln1 such as 
hasLnAnoReq(Ln1, 3). Instead of taking all QIs of databases, the linkage QIs should be 
determined so as to reduce the amount of data generalisation. Therefore, Rules 3-4 are 
reasoned about to identify linkage QIs based on the relationship between requestor 
roles and databases. For example, dealing the linkage request req1 with the facts like 
hasRole(req1, Clinician), hasResource(req1, Ln1), authenticate(DB1, Clinician) and 
linkFrom(Ln1, DB1), only the QIs in DB1 will be utilised as linkage QIs, such as 
hasQI(DB1, Gender) and hasLnQI(Ln1, Gender). As a consequence of semantic 
reasoning, the linkage set is anonymised with ever-changing QIs, which are aligned 




Figure 3. Semantic notations for LA execution. 
 
 
Privacy violations due to inference can be avoided through enforcing semantic-
based risk analysis on anonymous tuples. As introduced, associated attributes identified 
from ‘previous release’ such as Mandarin → Chinese are used to verify the privacy of 
attribute values of ‘current release’. For instance, hierarchical attributes about 
Ethnicity4 and Language5 provides semantic notations expressed as Language(7104-
Mandarin), Ethnicity(6101-Chinese), hasAncestor(7104-Mandarin,71-Chinese), 
                                                          
4 Australian Statistic Bureau. Australian Standard Classification of Cultural and Ethnic Groups, 2016. 
5 Australian Statistic Bureau. Australian Standard Classification of Languages, 2016. 
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hasAncestor(6101-Chinese,61-Chinese Asia) as well as potential associations 
implies(7104-Mandarin, 6101-Chinese). Suppose some rule antecedents (e.g. 7104-
Mandarin) are required to be generalised once they appear in linkage tuples. Therefore, 
we can attach the security measure to association rules such as AssociationRule(AR1), 
antecedentOf(7104-Mandarin, AR1) and enforce(Generalisation, AR1). Through 
locating attribute values in the tuple tup1 (Rule 5), both Rule 6 and Rule 7 are reasoned 
about to eliminate potential leakage from anonymised linkage. With the results 
enforce(Generalisation, tup1) and regarding(tup1, 7104-Mandarin), it is suggested 
replacing the value 7104-Mandarin with 71-Chinese to protect ethnicity details from 
being refined in the relevant records, such as 61-Chinese Asia (includes Mongolia). 
 
 
Table 1. Semantic rules for linkage anonymity. 
3. Case Study – Simulated linkage between ADDN and VicHealth Clients 
The experimental data used in this case study was based on 1000 patients collected 
from the Australasian Diabetes Data Network (ADDN, http://www.addn.org.au/) and 
1850 respondents from the Victorian Health Promotion Foundation (VicHealth, 
https://www.vichealth.vic.gov.au/). Through allocating 500 individuals in both systems 
with different attributes, experiments were performed on a laptop with Windows 7 
operation system (3.20 GHz Intel Core processor and 8GB Memory) to compare the 
performance of linkage k-anonymity (LA) and semantic-based linkage k-anonymity 
(SLA) through using Scheme1 and Scheme2 at time1 and time2 (time1<time2). Due to 
the attribute accumulation, association rules mined from time1 release can be included 
into the knowledge base to deal with the repeated request at time2. 
3.1. Metrics of Privacy Cost and Utility 
Privacy cost refers to the chance of re-identification by adversaries. Given the 
‘unknown presence’ in the linkage set, Eq. (2) can be defined to measure the disclosure 
risk of each individual shared by all databases. In particular, Pr(CIi) stands for the 
Purpose Semantic Rules 
Scheme 
Formation 
1. Linkage(?ln), Database(?db), linkFrom(?ln,?db), hasAnonymity(?db,? ano), 
hasAnoReq(?ano, ?n#decimal) →hasAnoReq(?ln, ?n#decimal) 
2. Linkage(?ln), hasAnoReq(?ln,?n1#decimal), hasAnoReq(?ln,?n2#decimal), 
greaterThan(?n1#decimal, ?n2#decimal) → hasLnAnoReq(?ln,?n1#decimal) 
3. Database(?db), hasAnonymity(?db,?ano), hasQI(?ano,?qi) →hasQI(?db,?qi) 
4. Request (?req), hasResource (?req, ?res), hasRole(?req,?role), linkage(?res), 
linkFrom(?res,?db), authenticate(?db,?role), hasQI(?db,?qi) → hasLnQI(?res,?qi); 
Risk 
Analysis 
5. Linkage(?ln), hasTuple(?ln,?tup), hasAttrVal(?ln,?val) → hasAttVal(?ln,?val) 
6. Linkage(?ln), hasAttVal(?ln,?att), AssociationRule(?ar), antecedentOf(?att,?ar), 
enforce(?me,?ar) → enforce(?me,?ln) 
7. Linkage(?ln), enforce(?me,?ln), hasAncestor(?val1,?val_1), hasTuple(?ln,?tup), 
hasAttVal(?tup,?val2), hasAttVal(?tup,?val_1), implies(?val2,?val1)→enforce(?me,?tup), 
regarding(?tup,?val2) 
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possibility of uniquely identifying CIi from the equivalence class, Classi to which the 







Based on the individual possibility, the average possibility can be calculated as the 
measure of privacy cost incurred by the linkage set, as defined in Eq. (3). Specially, n 





∑nPr(CIi) (3)  
 
The function ‘Sum of Squared Error (SSE)/Sum of Squared Table (SST)’ was 
applied to measure the information loss of micro-aggregating values in equivalence 
groups [8]. Since the within-groups SSE is never greater than SST, reported values (%) 
are in the range of [0,100]. Dealing with categorical attributes, the original and 
modified values can be quantified by the level of hierarchies they represent. Specially, 
the SSE (SST) is calculated by the Eq. (4). 
 
SSE=∑n∑m dis(xij, x’ij)
2 (4)  
where  xij = original attribute value 
 x’ij = anonymised attribute value (x’ij = 0 once calculating SST) 
 dis() = distance between attributes within the hierarchical structure 
 m = the number of quasi-identifiers in the linkage set 
 
3.2. Evaluation Result and Discussion 
Table 2 compares the performance of de-identifying linkage with LA and SLA. With 
different sets of linkage QIs, the impact caused by local changes is apparent. At time1, 
both approaches perform identically in terms of privacy preservation since there is no 
available knowledge at that given time. The anonymity requirement can never decrease, 
i.e. once data is linked and released the risk can never diminish, hence the disclosure 
risk can be calculated based on the associations mined from the previous 2-anonymised 
linkage at time1. With Language information representing the fourth QI in ADDN, 
ADDN-VicHealth linkage will be anonymised based on Scheme2. As shown, the actual 
disclosure risk by using LA is equal to or higher than the SLA, with the result 
comparison 14.7% vs 14.7% (k=2), 5.0% vs 4.3% (k=3) and 4.7% vs 3.4% (k=4). This 
shows that with privacy verification, certain risky information will be detected and 
processed by using SLA to anonymise linkage. Similar to the privacy analysis, the 
utility comparison between LA and SLA is conducted under the temporal consideration. 
There is an increased data loss incurred with higher requirements under both schemes. 
Based on mining previous releases, the semantic approach becomes effective for risky 
values whenever the same linkage request is applied again, i.e. LA may be able to 
preserve more information however it runs a higher risk of re-identification than SLA-
based linkage. Although the verification results in data generalisation, the major 
improvement in data quality is due to the linkage QI attribute filter. 
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Table 2. Privacy Cost and Information Loss by using LA and SLA. 
4. Conclusions and Future work 
In this paper, we propose a semantic-based linkage k-anonymity (SLA) approach based 
on k-anonymity and linkage properties with the aim of eliminating privacy disclosure 
risks while preserving data utility. In the future, we will further explore semantic 
approaches in privacy preserving record linkage (PPRL), while protecting patient 
privacy, where the accuracy of record matching should be maintained. 
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LA and SLA Time1: QI= {Gender, 
Ethnicity, Postcode} 
Time2: QI={Gender, Ethnicity, 
Postcode, Language}; 
k=2 k=3 k=4 k=2 k=3 k=4 
LA Disclosure risk (%) 14.7 5.2 3.5 14.7 5.0 4.7 
SSE/SST (%) 13.9 20.1 22.1 25.3 27.0 28.5 
SLA Disclosure risk (%) 14.7 5.2 3.5 14.7 4.3 3.4 
SSE/SST (%) 13.9 20.1 22.1 25.3 27.3 28.9 
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